Experimental investigation of burnup credit for safe transport, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. by Berry, Donald T. et al.
  
 
 
SANDIA REPORT 
SAND2004-0912 
Unlimited Release 
Printed April 2004 
 
 
Experimental Investigation of Burnup Credit 
for Safe Transport, Storage, and Disposal of 
Spent Nuclear Fuel 
 
Final Report 
 
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative 
Project 99-0200 
 
Gary A. Harms, Paul H. Helmick, John T. Ford, Sharon A. Walker, Donald T. Berry, 
and Paul S. Pickard 
 
Prepared by 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550 
 
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by  Sandia 
Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United 
States Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC04-
94AL85000. 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia 
Corporation. 
NOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor 
any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately 
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, 
trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their 
contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect 
those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. 
 
Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available 
copy. 
 
Available to DOE and DOE contractors from 
Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
P.O. Box 62 
Oak Ridge, TN  37831 
Telephone: (865)576-8401 
Facsimile: (865)576-5728 
E-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov 
Online ordering:  http://www.doe.gov/bridge 
 
Prices available from (615) 576-8401, FTS 626-8401 
 
Available to the public from 
  U.S. Department of Commerce 
  National Technical Information Service 
  5285 Port Royal Rd 
  Springfield, VA  22161 
 
  Telephone: (800)553-6847 
  Facsimile: (703)605-6900 
  E-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov 
Online order:  http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online 
 
 
 
  
 
 
SAND2004-0912 
Unlimited Release 
Printed March 2004 
 
Experimental Investigation of Burnup 
Credit for Safe Transport, Storage, and 
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Final Report 
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative 
 Project 99-0200 
Gary A. Harms and Paul H. Helmick 
Applied Nuclear Technologies 
John T. Ford 
Nuclear Reactor Facilities 
Sharon A. Walker 
Facility Engineering and Support 
Donald T. Berry 
Hot Cells and Gamma Facilities 
Paul S. Pickard 
Advanced Nuclear Concepts 
 
Sandia National Laboratories 
P. O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, NM 87185 
 
Abstract 
 
This report describes criticality benchmark experiments containing rhodium that were conducted as 
part of a Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Research Initiative project.  Rhodium is an important 
fission product absorber.  A capability to perform critical experiments with low-enriched uranium 
fuel was established as part of the project.  Ten critical experiments, some containing rhodium and 
others without, were conducted.  The experiments were performed in such a way that the effects of 
the rhodium could be accurately isolated.  The use of the experimental results to test neutronics codes 
is demonstrated by example for two Monte Carlo codes.  These comparisons indicate that the codes 
predict the behavior of the rhodium in the critical systems within the experimental uncertainties.  The 
results from this project, coupled with the results of follow-on experiments that investigate other 
fission products, can be used to quantify and reduce the conservatism of spent nuclear fuel safety 
analyses while still providing the necessary level of safety. 
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1. Executive Summary 
1.1. Research Objectives 
The Nuclear Energy Research Initiative funded a critical experiment focused on burnup 
credit issues at Sandia National Laboratories as project 99-0200.  This is the final report of 
that project.  The project has two products:  a critical experiment capability was established 
at Sandia that is now available to perform critical experiments with low-enriched fuel and 
benchmark criticality measurements were made that can be used to test the methods and data 
employed in the criticality safety analyses of shipping, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. 
Burnup credit is the process of accounting for the decrease in the reactivity of nuclear fuel 
produced by the changes in the fuel actinide concentrations and the buildup of fission product 
absorbers caused by the burning of the fuel.  To apply burnup credit safely, the methods used 
in its application must be validated: the fuel isotopic composition in the burned state must be 
accurately predicted, and the neutron multiplication of spent fuel configurations must be 
accurately predicted.  This project addresses the second part of the validation issue. 
A critical assembly with low-enriched UO2 fuel representative of light water reactors was 
built at Sandia.  The assembly concept is shown in Figure 1-1.  The figure shows a cut-away 
view of the assembly core and shows conceptually how experiment materials are inserted 
into the assembly.  It also includes a photograph of one of the critical configurations of the 
assembly. 
The assembly consists of a water-moderated array of driver fuel elements surrounding a 
smaller number of experiment fuel elements.  Test materials can be inserted between the fuel 
pellets in the experiment elements to allow accurate measurements of the reactivity worth of 
important fission products. The assembly also includes three fuel-followed control/safety 
elements and a fueled source element.   
The benchmark data from the project are the measured critical array sizes for configurations 
with and without an experiment material.  The critical configurations can be analyzed with 
criticality safety analysis codes.  The difference between the calculated result and the 
measured result gives the bias in the code and the nuclear data.  Critical experiments can be 
performed in the unperturbed assembly and with a test material, a fission product simulant, 
present in the assembly.  The data from the unperturbed assembly can be used to “zero out” 
analysis biases due to all other sources than from the experiment material.  This allows not 
only integral tests of the codes but also tests of the nuclear data for a specific material.   
1.2. Project Synopsis 
Five broad tasks were outlined in the project proposal: 
• Task 1 – Obtain the necessary National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) approvals. 
• Task 2 – Prepare safety basis documentation for the experiment and obtain approvals. 
• Task 3 – Design and procure the experiment hardware. 
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• Task 4 – Perform the benchmark experiments. 
• Task 5 – Decommission and decontaminate the experiment. 
The NEPA approvals for the experiment were obtained in the first year of the project.  Sandia 
filed an Environmental Checklist/Action Description Memorandum with the Department of 
Energy requesting that the experiment be categorically excluded from further NEPA 
documentation.  The exclusion was granted. 
The critical experiments were performed in the reactor room of the Sandia Pulsed Reactor 
Facility (SPRF) in Sandia’s Technical Area V.  Early in the project, the determination was 
made that an addendum to the SPRF Safety Analysis Report (SAR) would be required to 
establish the safety basis for the critical experiments.  The SAR addendum was completed 
and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the operation of the critical assemblies were 
written.  Both documents were submitted to the Sandia Internal Review and Appraisal 
System (SIRAS) for safety review.  The SIRAS review was completed in April, 2001.  The 
SAR addendum and the TSR were then submitted for DOE approval.  The DOE approval of 
the SAR addendum and the TSR was received in December, 2001.  A three-part readiness 
assessment was then initiated.  The readiness assessment culminated in a review of the 
facility and the experiment by a DOE team in late February, 2002.  Issues identified in the 
DOE readiness assessment team were resolved and approval to operate the critical assembly 
was obtained.   
The design of the critical assembly hardware was completed and procurement of the non-fuel 
hardware was initiated in the second year of the project.  The assembly hardware was 
received and assembled.  Two grid plate sets were obtained, each with different fuel element 
spacing, to give different neutron spectra in the assembly.  The critical assembly was 
controlled with the instrumentation and control system from an earlier critical experiment 
that was modified for this project.  The driver fuel elements, which were fabricated in 1996 
as part of another critical experiment, were transferred from Los Alamos National Laboratory 
to Sandia.  The experiment fuel elements, the control/safety elements and the source 
elements utilize the same uranium dioxide fuel stock as used in the driver fuel fabrication.  
These fuel elements utilize cladding assemblies fabricated by a commercial nuclear fuel 
vendor and loaded with fuel pellets at Sandia. 
The critical experiments performed as part of this project were designed to investigate the 
reactivity effect of rhodium, one of the fission products most important to burnup credit, on 
the assembly.  Circular rhodium foils with the same diameter as the fuel pellets were 
obtained in three thicknesses.  The foils were placed between the fuel pellets in the 
experiment fuel elements.  First, the critical array size with only driver fuel was determined.  
Then the 36 fuel elements surrounding the central source element were removed and replaced 
with experiment fuel elements that had been “poisoned” with rhodium and the critical array 
size measured.  Experiments with three different foil thicknesses gave data for different 
levels of self-shielding in the foils. 
All ten of the critical experiments planned as part of the project were performed.  Five 
experiments were conducted with each of the two grid plates: one with driver fuel only; one 
with experiment elements containing no poison foils; and one with each of the three sets of 
experiment elements loaded with rhodium foils.  During each of the experiments, the critical 
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assembly was loaded in a sequence of steps starting with a low multiplication configuration 
and proceeding to progressively higher multiplication.  Each step provided an updated 
estimate (by extrapolation) of the number of rods required to reach a critical configuration. 
1.3. Results 
The critical array size was measured for the ten critical experiments.  The peak multiplication 
of the experiments ranged from 685 to 2381.  All of the actual critical array sizes included a 
fractional fuel element estimated by extrapolation of the measured multiplication data.  
Knowing the critical array size and the incremental worth of the fuel elements, the 
eigenvalues for integral arrays was determined.  The experimental uncertainty in the 
eigenvalues was 0.15% for the experiments performed at 2.0 cm pitch and 0.08% at 2.8 cm 
pitch when comparing these experiments with unrelated experiments (e.g. critical 
experiments not performed as part of this project).  When making comparisons between the 
experiments in this set at a given pitch, the experimental uncertainties are reduced to 0.030% 
at 2.0 cm pitch and 0.040% at 2.8 cm pitch. 
The results of the experiments were compared with the results from two different Monte 
Carlo codes widely used for criticality safety analyses.  The biases between the calculations 
and the experiments were consistent with the biases for the same codes for other critical 
experiments containing low-enriched UO2 fuel. 
The real value of these experiments is in the data they provide to test the accuracy of the 
treatment of rhodium by the codes.  Two critical configurations without rhodium were 
included in the experiment set for each fuel element pitch.  These configurations were 
included to “zero out” most of the bias between calculations and experiments so the effect of 
the rhodium could be isolated.  The reactivity worth of the rhodium in the experiments 
ranged from 0.97% to 3.51%.   Both codes reproduced these reactivity worths within the 
smaller experimental uncertainties for correlated experiments. 
1.4. Future Potential 
In addition to producing benchmark critical measurements and data on rhodium in critical 
systems, this project leaves intact a capability to perform low-enriched critical experiments at 
Sandia.  A large fraction of the project resources were expended establishing this capability.  
Subsequent critical experiments can use the capability with a much reduced up-front cost.    
There are a number of ways that this capability can be exploited.  In fact, another NERI 
project using this capability, Reactor Physics and Criticality Benchmark Evaluations for 
Advanced Nuclear Fuel (01-124) was in progress when this report was written.  Other 
possible uses of the critical experiment capability could be: 
1. Measure the behavior of other fission products on a critical system.  Such follow-on 
experiments could be used to provide the justification for the inclusion of fission products 
in the criticality analysis of spent fuel shipping, storage, and disposal configurations. 
2. Measure static reactor physics parameters of critical systems with higher (e.g. >5%) 
enrichment such as are being done in NERI project 01-124.  Such experiments could 
include measurements of fission density profiles, soluble poison reactivity worths, 
burnable poison rod reactivity worth, and others. 
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3. Examine the static reactivity behavior of new burnable poison types or configurations. 
4. Perform critical experiments with variable enrichments to simulate the graded 
enrichments in BWR cores. 
5. Examine cores with axially graded enrichment and possibly graded fission product 
content to simulate the end effects in spent nuclear fuel. 
6. Perform critical experiments with Generation IV fuels and with transmutation fuels. 
7. Examine the reactor physics behavior of transmutation targets. 
These are examples of experiments that could be performed with the critical experiment 
capability established as part of this project.  Many other studies are possible. 
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2. Introduction 
The US Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) funded a critical 
experiment at Sandia National Laboratories focused on burnup credit issues.  The Burnup 
Credit Critical Experiment (BUCCX) was used to evaluate reactivity effects of fission-
product species in support of activities to establish burnup credit in handling, storage, and 
transport of spent nuclear reactor fuel. As fuel is burned in a nuclear reactor, its ability to 
sustain a fission chain reaction decreases due to the "burnup" process where the fissionable 
species are depleted and fission-products, some of which are strong neutron absorbers, build 
up.  Burnup credit is the process of accounting for this decrease in the reactivity of spent 
nuclear fuel in criticality safety analyses.  Such a credit, in allowing more fuel to be shipped 
in a given cask or container, can have large economic benefit by reducing both the number of 
casks and number of shipments required to handle a given inventory of spent reactor fuel.   
To apply burnup credit safely, the methods used in its application must be validated: the fuel 
isotopic composition in the burned state must be accurately predicted, and the neutron 
multiplication of spent fuel configurations must be accurately predicted.  The BUCCX 
addresses the second part of the validation issue.  While the number of critical experiments 
that include the actinides important to burnup credit is significant, the database of 
experiments with critical systems that include single fission products is sparse.  The BUCCX 
helps fill this gap.  A critical assembly fueled by low-enriched UO2 was built.  Fission 
product materials were inserted into the assembly to determine the effect of the materials on 
array size at delayed critical.  These measurements have extended the database that can be 
used to validate burnup credit analyses. 
The BUCCX benefited from facilities and earlier work on critical experiments at Sandia.  
The control system and a significant amount of the assembly hardware was acquired for the 
Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Critical Experiment (CX) (SNL 1989).  The CX was 
designed to simulate a nuclear thermal propulsion reactor and addressed design margins, 
controllability and accident scenarios of this type of reactor.  The safety basis analysis and 
the assembly fuel were from the Spent Fuel Safety Experiment (Harms 1995), a critical 
experiment to measure the effect of spent fuel on a critical system.  The BUCCX was 
operated in the SPRF. 
The BUCCX was a fuel-replacement experiment. The critical loading of an assembly of 
“fresh” fuel (e.g. fuel containing only unirradiated UO2) in a given configuration was 
measured. A fission product material, rhodium, was then be inserted into the assembly and 
the critical loading measured again. The benchmark data obtained from the experiment is the 
difference between the critical fuel loading with unmodified fuel and the loading with the 
addition of the fission product. Approximately 350 unirradiated driver fuel rods were 
available for the experiment. Similar in design and composition to those of a nuclear power 
reactor, they consisted of low-enriched uranium-dioxide pellets in Zircaloy cladding tubes 
that can be configured to represent the physical characteristics of such reactors. 
The assembly was designed to accommodate the distribution of benign chemical simulants 
for specific fission-product nuclides in the assembly. The fission product simulants can be 
included interstitially between fuel elements or inside special assembly fuel elements 
designed for the purpose. Assemblies loaded with fission product simulants can be used to 
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study burnup effects without having to deal with the radiological complications of actual 
spent nuclear fuel and its associated very-high-radioactivity environment. The BUCCX 
design allows for a wide variety of fission-product simulants and their distributions to be 
studied while remaining comfortably within the safety analysis limits defined in an 
addendum to the SPRF Safety Analysis Report (SNL 2002a).  
The assembly was designed so that the experiments were as clean as possible.  The materials 
that have significant impact on the reactivity of the assembly were limited to materials that 
are present in spent nuclear fuel.  The fuel is 4.31% enriched UO2 in zircaloy cladding 
moderated by water and supported by aluminum grid plates.  The UO2 was used in the 
Critical Mass Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in several 
experiments (for example, LEU-COMP-THERM-002) documented in the International 
Handbook of Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (NEA 2002).  Small amounts of 
other materials, such as aluminum and polyethylene, are included in the assembly and have a 
small reactivity impact on the assembly. 
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3. Background 
3.1. Project Goal 
As nuclear fuel is burned, the composition of the fuel changes due to the depletion of the 
actinide species and the buildup of fission products.  The reactivity of the fuel decreases as 
fissile materials are burned and fission product poisons are accumulated.  Taking account of 
this reactivity decrease (burnup credit) allows spent nuclear fuel to be safely packed in more 
dense arrays in transportation, storage, and disposal configurations than would be possible if 
the composition changes were ignored.  Allowing such burnup credit will result in significant 
cost savings in the handling of spent nuclear fuel while maintaining the required level of 
safety. 
A key issue related to acceptance of spent fuel burnup credit is the verification of the impact 
of the composition of the spent fuel on the system self-multiplication factor. The critical 
experiments described here directly address this issue.  The objective here is to provide 
benchmark data to verify the accuracy of the methods used to determine the criticality safety 
of spent nuclear fuel shipping, storage, and disposal configurations.   
The ability to accurately predict the multiplication factor for spent nuclear fuel configurations 
depends on two important factors:  (1) accurate determination of the constituents of the spent 
fuel, and (2) accurate calculation of the multiplication factor for the known composition and 
geometry.  The experiments reported here provide benchmark data for critical systems with 
accurately known composition in a geometry that is easily modeled with the current 
generation of criticality safety analysis software.  This research produced criticality data 
specifically applicable to transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel and provides a 
general experimental configuration and capability that can be further used to augment the 
existing criticality database.  
3.2. Project Justification 
A large amount of time, money, and effort are to be invested in the storage, transportation 
and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). A significant fraction of the costs is proportional to 
the number of containers required for the storage, transportation and disposal of SNF. 
Currently, the number of canisters required is conservatively high as a result of numerous 
conservative assumptions in the safety analyses required by regulators. These conservative 
assumptions are required because of the paucity of criticality safety benchmarks that include 
fission product isotopes in the neutron spectra associated with storage, transportation and 
disposal environments of SNF.  
The DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has been 
particularly concerned with minimization of shipments to a geologic repository and therefore 
with maximizing the quantity of SNF within transportation packages. The primary emphasis 
in this effort has been to obtain burnup credit, that is, credit for the isotopic changes in the 
fuel during its burnup history.  It has been proposed that burnup credit can produce 
significant national budget savings in reduced transportation costs alone.  This effort to 
obtain burnup credit has met with significant resistance from the Nuclear Regulatory 
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Commission (NRC). That resistance was based on the uncertainty of the calculated isotopics 
resulting from fuel burnup and on the uncertainty in the nuclear data for fission products used 
in the criticality analyses. 
The resistance in the area of burnup credit resulted in OCRWM taking a tiered approach in 
applying for acceptance by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  DOE OCRWM submitted 
the Actinide-Only Burnup Credit Topical Report (DOE 1998) to the NRC for approval.  In 
response, the NRC issued Interim Staff Guidance on burnup credit (NRC 1999) that allowed 
the use of actinide-only burnup credit.  The restriction to just actinides provides only a 
fraction of the desired level of criticality burnup credit.  The need for the restriction 
illuminates the general need for additional criticality data. Furthermore, it points to 
regulatory issues about integral benchmarks. Specifically, it indicates that regulators are 
unwilling to accept small errors that may be due to a cancellation of two or more competing 
errors. In order to address this regulatory concern it is essential that the isotopics calculations 
(calculations that track the material composition changes that are a result of burnup) and the 
criticality calculations be benchmarked separately. This logic can be extended to fission 
product constituents, that is, that the effect of each constituent that affects the reactivity of a 
system be benchmarked separately for its effect on the calculation. 
This project addresses the issue of criticality calculations in systems containing fission 
products.  It provides new benchmark data on rhodium, one of the important fission product 
absorbers.  These results, coupled with the results of follow-on experiments that investigate 
other fission products, can be used to quantify and reduce the conservatism of the SNF safety 
analyses while still providing the necessary level of safety.  
3.3. Earlier Work 
This experiment is similar to one that was proposed earlier at Sandia (Harms 1995). The 
Spent Fuel Safety Experiment (SFSX) was a critical experiment designed to measure the 
integral worth of spent fuel.  The SFSX was designed but not completed.  The SFSX was a 
fuel-replacement experiment.  As such, it consisted of a series of three approach-to-critical 
experiments.  The first experiment was to use only fresh “driver” fuel elements and provide 
the first benchmark in the series and a demonstration of the approach to critical procedures.  
The primary benefit of this fresh fuel data point was to provide a benchmark in a very 
“clean” configuration.  It also would provide a basis for the determination of the spent fuel 
worth, which was to be measured in subsequent approach-to-critical experiments. 
For the second experiment, the seven centrally located driver fuel elements were to be 
replaced by spent fuel taken from the midsection of a spent-fuel assembly that had been 
chemically analyzed earlier.  The center sections of the spent fuel rods were selected 
specifically to eliminate considerations of axial burnup variations.  Replacing the fresh fuel 
with the spent fuel would have resulted in a decrease in multiplication, directly providing the 
reactivity worth of the spent fuel.  Fresh fuel was to be added to the remaining outer locations 
in the assembly until a delayed critical configuration was reached.  This configuration was 
the benchmark data point for calculation of a spent fuel critical. 
The third experiment was similar to the second except that the spent fuel was to have 
originated from the end sections of the spent fuel assembly.  The distribution of burnup 
effects, particularly the under-burned ends of the fuel rods, was addressed by this third 
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measurement.  Because the burnup of the end fuel section had a strong gradient, this 
measurement, in addition to giving a comparison of the worth of end and center sections, 
provided a challenging benchmark for axial nodalization in criticality calculations. 
A sketch of the SFSX assembly is shown in Figure 3-1.   The assembly was designed to 
provide “clean” criticals in which the only materials that had a significant effect on the 
reactivity of the system (the driver fuel, the irradiated fuel sample, and the water moderator) 
were well characterized.  The assembly had fuel-followed control and safety rods which, 
when fully raised, were neutronically identical to driver fuel rods.  The assembly was 
designed so that the spent fuel could be lowered from the assembly into a well-shielded 
position below the floor level of the reactor room. 
The driver fuel for the SFSX was 4.31 % enriched UO2 pellets with an outside diameter of 
1.27 cm.  This fuel was fabricated with a nominal 50-cm fuel height.  The cladding was 
Zircaloy-4 with a 1.27-cm-thick lower end plug and a 2.54-cm-thick upper end plug. The 
 
Figure 3-1.  Sketch of the Spent Fuel Safety Experiment critical assembly. 
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assembly and the driver fuel rods were designed such that when the fuel was inserted in the 
assembly, the top of the lower end plug was at the elevation of the top of the lower grid plate.  
The upper and lower edges of the upper end plug were at the same elevations as the upper 
and lower surfaces of the upper grid plate.  As a result, the end plugs in the fresh fuel exactly 
filled the holes drilled in the grid plates.  The assembly could be modeled as a fuel/clad/water 
region with solid metal plates above and below surrounded by a water reflector. 
The SFSX assembly was designed for optimum sensitivity to the effects of interest rather 
than to mock up any specific fuel configuration.  The fuel rod pitch was chosen to minimize 
the total fuel loading at delayed critical (DC).  The fuel height was set at 50 cm to give 
adequate sensitivity to the burnup gradients that exist over a relatively short distance at the 
ends of spent fuel rods. 
The SFSX was funded by the OCRWM.  The SFSX was designed, but the experiment was 
not completed.  However, several aspects of the SFSX project benefited this project.  First, 
the driver fuel for the SFSX was fabricated and available to this project.  Second, the 
Authorization Basis (AB) for the SFSX had been partially established and was used as the 
basis for the AB for this project.  Finally, the design concept of the current experiment is 
very similar to the SFSX design concept.   
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4. Overview of the Project 
The project, as envisioned in the original proposal, involved five major tasks.  The five tasks 
are described below. 
4.1. Task 1: Obtain the Required NEPA Approvals 
This task involved assuring compliance of the project with the NEPA.  An Environmental 
Checklist was filed with the Department of Energy requesting that the project be 
categorically excluded from further NEPA documentation based on the fact that it was an 
activity similar to that which had been carried out in the facility for many years.  The DOE 
granted the request.  This task consumed a relatively small fraction of the project resources. 
4.2. Task 2: Obtain Safety Basis Approvals 
In order to operate the critical experiment in the SPRF, the experiment activities were 
required to be enveloped by the approved authorization basis (AB) for the SPRF.  The Sandia 
Pulsed Reactor III (SPR-III) is an unmoderated fully-enriched metal-fueled fast burst reactor.  
The experiment uses a water-moderated array of UO2 fuel rods in the critical assembly.  
Though the hazards of the pulsed reactor enveloped the hazards presented by the critical 
experiment, the requirements for the two were significantly different. 
To address the difference between the SPR-III characteristics and those of the critical 
experiment, an addendum to the SPRF SAR (SNL 2002a) was written that described the 
characteristics and hazards of the critical experiment.  Chapters were written that covered the 
critical assembly, the critical assembly control system, and the potential hazards and 
accidents associated with the experiment.  An attempt was made to write the SAR addendum 
generally enough that a range of experiments could be done within the envelope described.  
The attempt was successful because a second critical experiment, this one with different fuel 
and different goals from the BUCCX, was funded in 2001 as NERI project 01-124 and was 
in progress when this report was written.   
The TSRs for the critical experiment (SNL 2002b) record the actions and conditions 
necessary to operate the critical experiments within the safety envelope defined in the SAR 
addendum.  The two documents represent a basis to safely operate a range of critical 
experiments in the SPRF. 
After the SAR addendum and the TSRs were completed, these were submitted to a three-
level independent review process.  The first level of review occurred in the Sandia Pulsed 
Reactor Committee (SPRC), a committee of engineers, scientists, and reactor operators from 
the reactor facility with working expertise in the operational safety of nuclear reactors.  In 
this review, the documents received a thorough line-by-line scrubbing.  The next level of 
review came from the Sandia Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee, a committee of 
individuals from both inside Sandia and outside Sandia with broad expertise in nuclear 
facility safety.  The documents received a higher-level but still thorough review.  Finally, the 
documents were submitted to the DOE for review and approval.  Approval was granted. 
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The AB documents were reviewed for areas requiring formalization in operating procedures.  
Seventeen formal Safe Operating Procedures and Technical Work Documents were written 
to control various aspects of the work. 
A Readiness Assessment (RA) was required before experiment operations commenced.  The 
intent of the RA was to assure Sandia and DOE that Sandia was prepared to operate the 
critical experiments safely.  The RA consisted of three parts: a management self-assessment 
by the reactor operations group, a Sandia RA by a Sandia group independent of the 
operations group, and a DOE RA.  All findings of the three parts were closed out prior to 
operations. 
The safety basis work was envisioned in the proposal as a significant task but not one that 
dominated the project.  As the project evolved, this work consumed a large fraction of the 
available resources. 
4.3. Task 3:  Design and Procure the Critical Assembly Hardware 
This task included the design and fabrication of the hardware used in the critical assembly.  
This critical experiment benefited from the hardware built for earlier critical experiments.  
The critical assembly hardware was based on the hardware used for a critical experiment 
conducted for the Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (SNTP) program (SNL 1989).  The 
driver fuel was built for the Spent Fuel Safety Experiment (Harms 1995) and used fuel 
material from the Critical Mass Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 
The nuclear and mechanical design of the critical experiment hardware was performed as 
part of this task.  Though the design was based on the earlier SNTP experiment, differences 
in the fuel required that much of the core hardware be redesigned.  Once the hardware was 
designed, it was put out for bid.  The new hardware was fabricated and delivered to Sandia. 
The control requirements for this experiment were similar to those for the SNTP critical 
experiment.  The instrument and control system from the earlier SNTP experiment was 
modified slightly and refurbished for use with the present experiment. 
Driver fuel elements had been fabricated for an earlier critical experiment (Harms 1995) 
using excess low-enriched UO2 fuel material from the Critical Mass Laboratory at the Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory.  The fuel, which had originally been clad in aluminum, was 
reclad into Zircaloy-4 by a commercial nuclear fuel manufacturer as part of the SFSX 
project.  The 350 fuel elements had been stored at Los Alamos National Laboratory after 
fabrication and were shipped to Sandia for use in this experiment. 
The driver fuel elements contain a large fraction of the fuel in the critical experiments.  
Special fuel elements were required for control/safety elements, a source element, and 
experiment fuel elements.  The remainder of the stock of fuel that was used in fabricating the 
driver fuel elements was obtained from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.  This fuel 
was sent to the same firm that built the driver fuel elements and the UO2 fuel pellets were 
removed from the aluminum cladding.  The same company fabricated Zircaloy-4 tubes that 
were used for the control/safety elements, source element, and experiment elements.  The 
pellets and tubes were sent to Sandia where the fuel and other element internals were loaded 
into the tubes and the tubes were sealed. 
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This task was envisioned in the proposal as a straightforward process of the design, 
procurement and construction of the experiment fuel and hardware.  Significant obstacles 
were surmounted, with the help of DOE NE-20 to move the fabrication of the special fuel 
elements forward.  The remainder of the work under this task went as anticipated. 
4.4. Task 4:  Perform the Critical Experiments 
This task included the design and execution of the critical experiments.  A basic part of the 
experiment design was selection of the experiment philosophy and of the materials to be 
tested.  To accomplish this, an ad hoc panel of burnup credit experts was gathered together to 
advise the experiment team.  The panel made two recommendations:  1) do a few critical 
experiments well rather than many experiments in less depth, and 2) use rhodium as the first 
test material.  Both recommendations were accepted. 
The experiment design called for the placement of foils of a test material between the fuel 
pellets in the experiment fuel elements.  The test material selected was rhodium.  Thirty-one 
foils were required to place a foil between the 32 fuel pellets in each experiment fuel 
element.  Because each experiment contains 36 experiment fuel elements loaded with foils, 
1116 foils were required per experiment.  Three sets of 1200 rhodium foils were obtained at 
nominal thicknesses of 0.025, 0.05 and 0.1 mm.  The purity of the rhodium was 99.9%.  The 
rhodium foils were loaded into three sets of experiment fuel elements. 
Ten critical experiments, detailed below, were performed during the project. 
4.5. Task 5:  Decontaminate and Decommission the Assembly 
Under this task, the critical experiment hardware was removed from service, cleaned, and 
stored for future use.  The driver fuel was stored in 55-gallon 6M containers and transported 
to a storage location.  The experiment fuel elements, control/safety fuel elements, and source 
fuel element were stored at the reactor facility that hosted the critical experiments.  The 
critical assembly hardware was moved to a storage location.  All of the experiment hardware 
is easily retrievable so that it can be readily used for future critical experiments. 
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5. Critical Assembly Design 
The overall concept of the critical assembly is shown in Figure 5-1.  The assembly core 
resides in an elevated assembly tank that is connected to a moderator dump tank at a lower 
elevation.  When the assembly is not being operated, the moderator resides in the dump tank.  
When the assembly is being brought to critical, the moderator is pumped from the dump tank 
into the assembly tank.  The moderator is released by gravity to the dump tank through two 
large-diameter pneumatically operated dump valves.  A heater is included in the dump tank 
to keep the moderator at a constant temperature set by a controller at the assembly control 
system.  During operation, the moderator is continually circulated between the dump tank 
and the assembly tank.  The level of the moderator in the assembly tank is set by a standpipe. 
The assembly fuel is supported in the assembly tank by two 2.54 cm (1 in) thick aluminum 
grid plates.  The grid plates are located in the tank to provide a 15.24 cm (6 in) thick water 
reflector below the lower grid plate.  The diameter of the tank provides a radial water 
reflector around the assembly greater than 15.24 cm.  The assembly tank standpipe is set to 
provide a 15.24 cm (6 in) thick upper reflector when the assembly tank is full. 
The assembly has one control and two safety elements of identical design.  The two types of 
elements are differentiated by the way in which they are used.  During operations, the two 
safety elements are held in the most reactive position and provide a redundant shutdown 
mechanism that can be rapidly inserted by gravity drop.  The control element is used to make 
fine adjustments to the reactivity of the assembly during operations.  The three control/safety 
elements are attached to the SNTP CX control rod drives through electromagnets.  The 
control element drives are supported above the assembly tank by the drive support. 
5.1. Fuel 
5.1.1. Driver Fuel Elements 
Most of the fuel elements in any given critical array were driver fuel elements.  The design of 
the driver fuel elements is shown in Figure 5-2.  The driver fuel elements were fabricated in 
1996 by Siemens Power Corporation from UO2 fuel pellets supplied by the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL) using Zircaloy-4 tubing welded to end plugs of Zircaloy-2 or 
Zircaloy-4. 
The UO2 fuel pellets in the fuel elements were in fuel rods used in critical experiments at the 
Critical Mass Laboratory at the PNNL.  Several of the experiments are documented in the 
International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Experiments (NEA 2001) as LEU-COMP-
THERM-002 and others.  According to the documentation of those experiments, the uranium 
is 4.306 percent enriched and has a density of 10.4 g/cm
3
.  The outside diameter of the fuel 
pellets is 1.265 ± 0.003 cm (0.498 ± 0.001 in).  The nominal stack height of the UO2 pellets 
is 49.213 cm (19.375 in).  According to the material accountability records, mass of the UO2 
in the fuel rods was measured to the nearest half gram and ranged from a minimum of 616 g 
to a maximum of 652 g with an average of 637.73 g.  The average 
235
U content of the driver 
elements is 24.12 g with a maximum of 24.66 g and a minimum of 23.32 g. 
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Source Element Drive
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PPS Detector Wells
Moderator Level Sensor Standpipe
Moderator Overflow Standpipe
PPS Electronics
Assembly
Tank
Dump Tank
Moderator Dump Valves
Figure 5-1.  Overall view of the BUCCX critical assembly. 
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Figure 5-2.  Details of the driver fuel element design.  The dimensions are given 
in inches. 
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The cladding tubes were fabricated from Zircaloy-4 instrument or guide tubes with an outer 
diameter of 1.382 ± 0.005 cm (0.544 ± 0.002 in) and an inner diameter of 1.298 ± 0.005 cm 
(0.511± 0.002 in) giving a nominal wall thickness or 0.042 cm (0.017 in).  The fuel elements 
were sealed at the bottom by welding to a 1.27 cm (0.5 in) end plug of Zircaloy-2 or 
Zircaloy-4.  The top is sealed by welding the tube to a 2.54 cm (1 in) plug of the same 
material.  Both end plugs incorporated a circumferential groove.  The top plugs had a 
threaded hole for use with a handling fixture.  A corrosion-resistant spring was placed 
between the fuel pellets and the top plug.  Before the final seal weld was made, the elements 
were pressurized with helium.  After the final seal weld, a helium leak check was made to 
verify that the leak rate was less than 1x10
-8
 cc/s of helium. 
The driver fuel elements were designed to be supported by two 2.54 cm (1 in) thick grid 
plates.  The bottom plug fits in a 1.27 cm (0.5 in) deep hole in the lower grid plate.  The 
lower plug then lines up with the grid plate to make the combination appear as a solid sheet 
of metal.  With the appropriate grid plate spacing, the upper plug of the fuel elements lines 
up with the upper grid plate, making the upper plug/grid plate to appear neutronically as a 
solid sheet of metal.  
5.1.2. Experiment Fuel Elements 
The experiment fuel elements are designed to mimic the driver fuel elements neutronically 
while allowing access to the fuel pellets in the element so that experiment materials can be 
placed between the fuel pellets.   
The cladding tubes for the experiment fuel elements have the same radial dimensions as the 
tubes for the driver fuel elements but are longer.  The bottom plugs for the experiment fuel 
elements are identical to those for the driver fuel elements.  The upper end of the experiment 
fuel elements is sealed by a 14 mm Swagelok cap.  The experiment elements are longer than 
driver elements so that the cap is well away from the assembly fuel and will not affect the 
experiment results.  Between the bottom plug and the cap, the materials inside the clad tube 
stack up as follows:  1) fuel pellets from the same source as the driver fuel elements with the 
same nominal stack height; 2) corrosion resistant spring; 3) 2.54 cm (1 inch) tall Zircaloy-2 
or Zircaloy-4 plug to line up with the upper grid plate; and 4) polyethylene plug.   
The experiment elements were made in three lengths so that the caps can be staggered in 
experiments where the fuel element pitch will not allow the caps to be placed side by side.  In 
all experiment elements, the fuel pellet stack, spring, and Zircaloy plug were the same height.  
Polyethylene plugs of different lengths make up the differences in element length.  The 
diameter of the polyethylene plugs was set so that the hydrogen in the polyethylene exactly 
replaces the hydrogen in the water displaced by the fuel rod. 
Experiment materials can be placed between the fuel pellets in the experiment elements.  In 
the critical experiments described here, rhodium foils with the same diameter as the fuel 
pellets were placed between the fuel pellets in the experiment elements. 
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5.1.3. Control and Safety Elements 
The critical assembly has three identical fuel-followed control/safety elements, two operated 
as safety elements and one operated as a control element.  During the execution of a critical 
experiment, the safety elements are held at their most reactive position.  In this position, the 
safety elements provide a large negative reactivity that is available to quickly shut down the 
assembly should the need arise.  The absorber section in the elements is also well away from 
the assembly core and does not affect the reactivity of the system.  The control element is 
used during critical assembly operations to make fine adjustments in the reactivity of the 
assembly.   
The fueled section of the control/safety elements is similar to an experiment element.  In 
order to allow the elements to be lowered from the assembly, the lower grid plate has through 
holes at the control/safety element positions.  To fill the grid plate hole completely, the 
bottom plugs on the control/safety elements are 2.54 cm (1 in) long.  The bottom plugs are 
the same design as the top plugs used in the driver fuel elements.  Above the bottom plug, the 
materials stack up the same as the materials in the experiment elements with the inclusion 
above the polyethylene plug of an absorber section and another polyethylene plug.  The 
upper seal of the control/safety element is made by a Swagelok union that couples the 
element to a threaded stainless steel fixture used to connect the element to the element drive 
through an electromagnet. 
The absorber section in the control/safety elements is an aluminum tube 1.27 cm (0.5 in) OD 
with 0.071 cm (0.028 in) walls plugged at both ends with 0.965 cm (0.38 in) aluminum 
plugs.  Inside the tube are eleven sintered natural B4C pellets, 5.08 cm (2.00 in) long by 
1.102 cm (0.434 in) diameter, with a nominal stack height of 55.88 cm (22 in).  The average 
mass of the B4C in the absorber sections is 96.88 g.  The B4C pellets are held at the bottom of 
the absorber section by a corrosion resistant spring. 
5.1.4. Source Element 
The source fuel element is a double fuel element with the two fueled sections separated by a 
15.24 cm (6 in) polyethylene plug.  The source element is attached to a drive similar to the 
control/safety element drives except that the source element is solidly attached to the drive 
without an electromagnet.  The upper fueled section mimics a driver fuel element.  The lower 
fueled section is similar to a driver fuel element except that the central three fuel pellets are 
replaced by a sealed 
252
Cf neutron source.  The lengths of the elements in the source rod are 
set so the Zircaloy plugs in the lower section line up with the grid plates when the source 
element is “up” and the same is true of the Zircaloy plugs in the upper section when the 
element is “down.”  The neutron source was used to drive the critical assembly during 
approach-to-critical experiments.  Once a self-sustaining chain reaction was established, the 
neutron source element was lowered from the assembly replacing the fueled section 
containing the source with a fueled section with no source. 
The neutron source is a commercially available source containing 
252
Cf.  The source was 
manufactured by Isotope Products Laboratory (IPL) and was listed in the IPL catalog as 
“Capsule 3014.”  The source was inserted into a holder fabricated from aluminum that had an 
overall length of 3.195 cm (1.258 in).  The bottom of the source holder was 21.695 cm 
(8.541 in) above the bottom of the fuel.  The arrangement of the source in the source holder 
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is shown in Figure 5-3.  The inset of the figure shows a diagram of the stainless steel 304 
source capsule from the IPL catalog. 
 
Source 
Capsule
Source 
Holder
 
Figure 5-3.  The neutron source and holder.  The inset is a figure from the IPL 
catalog showing the geometry of the neutron source capsule. 
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5.2. Hardware 
5.2.1. Grid Plates 
The two aluminum grid plates support and maintain the spacing of the fuel elements in the 
critical assembly.  Both grid plates are 2.54 cm (1 in) thick.  The lower grid plate is circular 
and is supported by a ring that is part of the assembly tank.  The lower grid plate has six large 
holes in it to allow passage of the moderator when the dump valves are opened.  The upper 
grid plate is hexagonal with three support bosses 120 degrees apart.  The holes for the fuel 
elements in the upper grid plate are numbered for identification.  The upper grid plate is 
supported from the lower grid plate by three threaded aluminum standoffs. 
The lower grid plate has 1.27 cm (0.5 in) deep holes bored in it to support and locate the 
bottom of the fuel elements.  The upper grid plate has matching through holes in it to locate 
the top of the fuel elements.  The central hole and three holes spaced 120 degrees apart are 
bored through in both grid plates to a slightly larger diameter to allow the source and 
control/safety elements to freely move through the grid plates. 
Two sets of grid plates were fabricated, one with the holes on a 2.8 cm triangular pitch and 
one with the holes on a 2.0 cm triangular pitch.  The fuel elements in the experiment, when 
placed in a 2.0 cm triangular pitch, have a fuel-to-water ratio similar to that of a pressurized 
water reactor fuel assembly.  With a 2.8 cm pitch, the fuel elements are nearly optimally 
moderated. 
5.2.2. Assembly Tank 
The assembly tank supports the assembly and contains the moderator during approach-to-
critical experiments.  The dimensions of the assembly tank are such that the assembly has 
15.24 cm (6 in) thick top and bottom reflectors and at least the same thickness radial reflector 
when the tank is full of moderator.  The tank is essentially cylindrical with a cylindrical 
projection out the bottom to accommodate the motion of the source and control/safety 
elements.  The assembly tank consists of two weldments and the grid plate support ring. 
The lower tank weldment has a 2.54 cm (1 in) thick floor that provides support for the 
assembly tank.  The floor is drilled and tapped to accommodate the tank supports and has 
holes to connect to the two moderator dump valves.  The floor also has a large central hole 
for the projection.  The weldment has a flange at the top with an O-ring groove used for 
connection to the grid plate support ring. 
The upper tank weldment is essentially a flanged tube.  The lower flange is drilled to match 
the flange on the lower tank weldment and the grid plate support ring.  The upper flange is 
drilled to connect to the support structure for the control/safety and source element drives.  
The inside diameter of the tank is 93.68 cm (36.88 in). 
The grid plate support ring fits between the upper and lower tank weldments and has an O-
ring groove in the surface that mates with the lower flange on the upper tank weldment.  The 
lower grid plate attaches to the grid plate support ring. 
The assembly tank is connected to two standpipes.  One standpipe contains a linear 
moderator level sensor.  The other contains an overflow pipe that determines the moderator 
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level.  The assembly tank also has a float switch used to indicate that the tank is full of 
moderator. 
5.2.3. Moderator Handling System 
The dump tank is a large vessel that is at a lower elevation than the assembly tank.  The two 
tanks are connected through two large-diameter pneumatically-operated normally-open dump 
valves.  When the assembly is shut down or fuel is being loaded during an experiment, the 
dump valves are open and the moderator is in the dump tank.  To make a multiplication 
measurement, the following sequence of events occurs:   
1. The dump valves are closed. 
2. Moderator is pumped from the dump tank to the assembly tank with the “fast” fill pump.  
It takes about 15 minutes to fill the assembly tank in this mode.   
3. When the float switch indicates “full,” the “fast” fill pump is turned off and a smaller 
recirculating pump is turned on.  The recirculating pump fills the assembly tank to the 
overflow standpipe and continues circulating water between the dump tank and the 
assembly tank to prevent thermal stratification of the moderator in the assembly tank.  
This also ensures that the moderator level is constant from measurement to measurement. 
4. At the end of the measurement, the dump valves are opened and the moderator flows 
from the assembly tank to the dump tank. 
The dump tank has an electrically-operated heater that is used to maintain a constant 
moderator temperature.  The heater can be used to elevate the moderator temperature several 
degrees to explore the effect of temperature on the critical assembly. 
5.2.4. Instrumentation and Control System 
The Instrument and Control (I&C) system for the assembly is divided into two subsystems: 
(1) The Plant Protection System (PPS), which provides the automatic scram function of the 
I&C system, and (2) the control system, which includes the equipment necessary for remote 
manipulation of all reactivity control mechanisms, startup source, and monitoring equipment. 
The automatic scram function refers to the automatic trip of the PPS to shutdown the 
assembly and protect the fuel elements. 
5.2.4.1. Plant Protection System 
The function of the Plant Protection System (PPS) is to rapidly scram the critical assembly if 
power level or period exceeds prescribed limits. The protection system is made up of two 
redundant channels of neutron flux monitoring systems and the magnet power supply trip 
system. A trip signal from either channel causes a scram independently of the other channel. 
There are also manual scrams operable from the control console and the reactor building.  
The neutron flux monitor consists of a neutron detector, an amplifier assembly, and a signal 
processor.  The neutron detectors are fission chambers that are placed in the detector wells in 
the assembly tank.  The locations of the detector wells are adjusted to give an appropriate 
count-rate range to cover the operating conditions of the assembly.  The amplifier assembly 
houses the power supplies and the electronics that condition the detector signal for 
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transmission to the signal processor. The signal conditioning electronics in the amplifier 
assembly provide amplification, pulse shaping, and discrimination against alpha and gamma 
radiation and electronic noise, and other signal conditioning to provide an output signal that 
can be transmitted over a twisted-shielded pair.  The signal processor converts the signal 
from the amplifier into signals that represent the source range count rate, the power level, and 
the rate of change of power level (period), and provides trip signals to the magnet power 
supply when any signal is outside a predetermined set point.  
5.2.4.2. Control System 
The control system portion of the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) system provides 
essential data to the operator for safe operation of the critical assembly, including core tank 
temperature, core tank level, control/safety element position and source position. The control 
panel is the means of remotely controlling reactivity addition or withdrawal from the core 
when the assembly is at or near delayed critical.  
The position of each of the control and safety elements is indicated by a digital meter that 
uses a bridge type circuit with a position potentiometer in one leg of the circuit. Control and 
safety element drive full-in and full-out positions are displayed using indicating lamps 
controlled by limit switches located on the element drive package. Additional lamps and limit 
switches provide indication when the element is fully down (seated) and when it is coupled 
to the drive mechanism.  Only the "up" (fully-out) indication is required for operation. 
5.2.4.3. Count-Rate Instrumentation 
The count-rate instrumentation is used during an approach-to-critical experiment to measure 
the assembly multiplication.  For all the critical experiments, the count-rate instrumentation 
included two scaler-timers, each counting pulses on buffered outputs from the two PPS 
channels.  A third channel was added for several of the critical experiments.  This channel 
was independent of the PPS and consisted of a fission chamber, preamplifier, amplifier, 
single channel analyzer, and scaler-timer.  The detector for this channel was outside but 
immediately adjacent to the assembly tank. 
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6. The Experiments 
6.1. Approach-to-Critical Experiments 
The critical experiments were done using the classical inverse multiplication method to do an 
approach-to-critical experiment.  The multiplication M of an assembly of fissile material is 
given by 
eff
eff
k
k
M
−
=
1
 
where keff is the eigenvalue of the fissile material.  When the assembly subcritical, keff is less 
than 1 and the multiplication is finite.  When the assembly is exactly critical, keff is 1 and the 
multiplication is infinite.  The inverse of the multiplication is positive when the assembly is 
subcritical and zero when the assembly is critical. 
During an approach-to-critical experiment, the assembly is driven by a constant neutron 
source.  For the experiments reported here, the neutron source was a small capsule containing 
252
Cf that emitted about 10
7
 neutrons per second.  Given a constant source, the neutron 
population in the assembly is proportional to the multiplication of the assembly.  A neutron 
detector placed in or near the assembly will respond to the neutron population at the detector 
location and will therefore give an indication that is proportional to the assembly 
multiplication. 
An approach-to-critical experiment is done by making a series of multiplication 
measurements as a function of increasing reactivity in the assembly.  The parameter that 
increases the assembly reactivity can be one of many choices.  In the case of the experiments 
reported here, the approach was made by varying the amount of fuel in the assembly.  The 
recipe for the approach-to-critical experiments done in this project is as follows: 
1. To start the experiment, detector readings are taken with an array that has been shown by 
calculation to be subcritical.  Fuel is added to the assembly to reach a more reactive 
configuration that has also been shown by calculation to be subcritical.  Detector readings 
are again taken.   
2. The inverse of the detector readings is plotted against the number of fuel elements in the 
assembly.  A straight-line projection is made between the two points to an inverse 
detector reading (inverse multiplication) of zero.  At this point, the number of fuel rods 
that are projected to produce an inverse multiplication of zero is the current estimate of 
the critical array size. 
3. From this point, the additions of fuel are guided by the measurements of the 
multiplication of the assembly.  The difference between the current estimate of the 
critical array size and the array size at the last measurement is divided by two and 
rounded down to the nearest integer to get the number of fuel elements to be added to the 
assembly for the next reactivity step.   
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4. After the fuel element increment is added to the assembly, a new multiplication 
measurement is made.  A linear extrapolation of the new inverse multiplication and the 
one immediately preceding it to zero gives a new estimate of the critical array size.   
5. The preceding two steps are repeated until the fuel element increment falls below one 
fuel element.   
6. The experiment is then walked upward in reactivity in one-element increments until a 
period is measured.  Count rate measurements are taken at each fuel increment and 
plotted to refine the estimate of the critical array size. 
Figure 6-1 demonstrates the process described above. During an approach-to-critical 
experiment, each successive measurement should normally produce a better estimate of the 
critical array size.  Figure 6-2 shows two plots of the results of one of the experiments.  The 
left plot shows the estimated critical array size as a function of the number of elements in the 
assembly.  The horizontal dashed line shows the final estimate of the critical array size.  The 
right plot shows the magnitude of the difference between the final critical array size and the 
estimated critical array size at each array size step.  The difference is a few hundredths of a 
fuel element at the end of the approach. 
6.2. Experiment Suite 
Ten critical experiments were conducted in this project.  The ten experiments were divided 
into two sets of five with each set having a different fuel element pitch to give different fuel-
to-water ratios.  The experiments were loaded as follows: 
1. All driver fuel elements, 2.0 cm pitch; 
2. 36 experiment fuel elements with no foils, 2.0 cm pitch; 
3. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 25-micron rhodium foils between the 32 
fuel pellets in the rods (a total of 1116 foils), 2.0 cm pitch; 
4. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 50-micron rhodium foils between the 32 
fuel pellets in the rods, 2.0 cm pitch; 
5. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 100-micron rhodium foils between the 
32 fuel pellets in the rods, 2.0 cm pitch; 
6. All driver fuel elements, 2.8 cm pitch; 
7. 36 experiment fuel elements with no foils, 2.8 cm pitch; 
8. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 25-micron rhodium foils between the 32 
fuel pellets in the rods, 2.8 cm pitch; 
9. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 50-micron rhodium foils between the 32 
fuel pellets in the rods, 2.8 cm pitch; 
10. 36 experiment fuel elements, each containing 31 100-micron rhodium foils between the 
32 fuel pellets in the rods, 2.8 cm pitch. 
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Where it was possible, the experiments were loaded with the same fuel element in each 
location.  For example, core configuration 1 above was converted into configuration 2 by 
replacing the 36 driver fuel elements surrounding the central source element with 36 
experiment fuel elements that contained no foils.  All other grid locations contained the 
identical fuel elements from configuration 1.  Similarly, configuration 5 differed from 
configuration 2 by the 36 experiment fuel elements containing rhodium foils and the addition 
of several driver fuel elements necessary to overcome the negative reactivity of the rhodium 
foils.  The fuel element differences between configurations 2 and 5 are shown in Figure 6-3.  
The fuel element differences between configurations 7 and 10 are shown in Figure 6-4. 
Figure 6-3.  Fuel element configuration of the core with 2.0 cm pitch and 100 micron 
rhodium foils.  Locations that had different loading from the configuration with no 
foils are highlighted.  The 36 locations surrounding the central element contained 
different experiment fuel elements.  The highlighted locations around the periphery 
indicate the driver fuel elements added to compensate for the negative reactivity of 
the rhodium foils. 
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The rhodium used in the experiment was 99.9% pure.  Assuming a nominal density for the 
rhodium of 12.40 g/cm
3
, the actual foil thicknesses based on the aggregate measured foil 
masses, were 25.2, 49.7 and 105.0 microns. 
The experiments were run with the moderator temperature held at approximately 300 K.  The 
last few steps of the two experiments that had 36 experiment fuel elements but no foils were 
repeated at a slightly elevated temperature to determine the magnitude of any temperature 
correction needed to obtain results at a constant temperature. 
Figure 6-4.  Fuel element configuration of the core with 2.8 cm pitch and 100 micron 
rhodium foils.  Locations that had different loading from the configuration with no 
foils are highlighted.  The 36 locations surrounding the central element contained 
different experiment fuel elements.  The highlighted locations around the periphery 
indicate the driver fuel elements added to compensate for the negative reactivity of 
the rhodium foils. 
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6.3. Experiment Results 
The ten critical experiments were done using the method described above. The results of the 
ten critical experiments are shown in Table 6-1.  The reported results are corrected to a 
temperature of 300 K.  The uncertainties reported with the critical array sizes are based on 
the uncertainty due to the counting statistics in the count rate data added in quadrature to the 
uncertainty in the temperature correction to 300 K. 
In some of the critical experiments, count-rate measurements were not done above a certain 
fuel loading because the settling time in the count rate was excessive.  The largest array size 
for which count-rate data were taken is shown in Table 6-2.  Also shown is the eigenvalue 
(keff) of the last measured configuration.  The eigenvalues were obtained by multiplying the 
fuel element difference between the loading at critical and the last measured configuration by 
the incremental fuel element worth as calculated with MCNP4C (LANL 2000) and 
subtracting from unity.  Given these eigenvalues, the multiplication of the last measured 
configuration was calculated and is also shown in the table.  The maximum multiplication 
ranged from a low of 685 to a high of 2381. 
These results can be compared to the results of an analysis method by doing a simulated 
approach-to-critical by analysis and comparing the measured critical array size with the 
calculated critical array size.  However, this requires that calculations be made for a number 
of different array configurations and an interpolation done between the calculated data 
points.   
Table 6-1.  Critical array sizes measured during the ten critical experiments.  The 
uncertainties shown account only for uncertainties in the critical array size 
measurement due to counting statistics and the temperature correction. 
Number of 
Experiment 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
2.0 cm pitch 
Measured Critical Size 
(elements) 
2.8 cm Pitch 
Measured critical size 
(elements) 
0 - 258.29 ± 0.03 132.30 ± 0.03 
36 0 258.09 ± 0.02 131.97 ± 0.03 
36 0.0252 270.67 ± 0.03 140.56 ± 0.03 
36 0.0497 279.62 ± 0.03 146.88 ± 0.03 
36 0.1050 294.75 ± 0.03 158.59 ± 0.03 
Table 6-2.  The largest array size measured for each experiment configuration.  Also 
listed is the eigenvalue and multiplication for each configuration.  
2.0 cm Pitch 2.8 cm Pitch Number of 
Experiment 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Fuel 
Elements 
keff 
Multi-
plication 
Fuel 
Elements 
keff 
Multi-
plication 
0 - 257 0.99896 962 132 0.99953 2128 
36 0 257 0.99915 1176 131 0.99854 685 
36 0.0252 270 0.99951 2041 140 0.99922 1282 
36 0.0497 279 0.99958 2381 146 0.99875 800 
36 0.1050 294 0.99948 1923 158 0.99922 1282 
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A more straightforward comparison between experiment and calculation can be done if the 
eigenvalue of a specific experimental configuration with an integer number of fuel elements 
can be determined.  This can be done by first calculating the incremental fuel element worth 
near the measured critical array size and multiplying that worth with the fractional difference 
in fuel elements between the measured critical configuration and the one to be calculated.  
For example, the critical configuration for the experiment with no experiment fuel elements 
and a pitch of 2.0 cm is most closely approximated by an array of 258 fuel elements.  The 
incremental worth of a fuel elements at this array size is calculated to be 0.00074 ± 0.00003 
for that array size.  The 0.29 element deficit then translates to a reactivity deficit of 0.00021 
giving an eigenvalue of 0.99979 for that configuration.  Table 6-3 lists the eigenvalues for 
configurations approximating the measured critical arrays for the ten critical experiments.  
The uncertainties here are based on the sum in quadrature of the uncertainty due to the 
counting statistics in the count rate data, the uncertainty in the temperature correction to 
300 K, and the uncertainty in the calculation of the worth of the incremental fuel element 
from the Monte Carlo statistics. 
6.4. Experiment Uncertainties 
As noted, the uncertainties reported above account only for the counting statistics and the 
uncertainty in the temperature correction.  There are many other sources of uncertainty in 
critical experiments such as these.  These sources of uncertainty can include tolerances on the 
dimensions of the parts of the assembly (e.g. pitch, fuel element OD, etc.), uncertainties in 
the amount of fissile material present (e.g. mass of fuel, enrichment, fuel stoichiometry, etc.), 
uncertainties in the composition of the assembly parts (e.g. clad, grid plates, etc.), and 
uncertainties in the measured temperature of the assembly.   
To estimate the magnitude of the uncertainties in the experiment, a series of KENO-V.a 
(ORNL 2000) calculations was done that included various perturbations of the nominal 
configuration of the assembly to get the sensitivity of the assembly eigenvalue to the various 
uncertainty sources.  The estimated uncertainties for the experiments are shown graphically 
in Figure 6-5.  Because the sources of uncertainty are uncorrelated, the proper way to get a 
total uncertainty in the experiments is to add them in quadrature. 
For the experiments with a pitch of 2.0 cm, the estimated uncertainty is 0.00147±0.00001.  
The accuracy of the uncertainty is based solely on the Monte Carlo statistics of the sensitivity 
Table 6-3.  Eigenvalues for configurations with integral fuel arrays.  The uncertainties 
shown account only for uncertainties due to counting statistics, the temperature 
correction, and statistical uncertainty in the fuel element worth calculations. 
2.0 cm Pitch 2.8 cm Pitch Number of 
Experiment 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Fuel 
Elements 
Eigenvalue 
Fuel 
Elements 
Eigenvalue 
0 - 258 0.99979±0.00002 132 0.99954±0.00004 
36 0 258 0.99993±0.00002 132 1.00004±0.00004 
36 0.0252 271 1.00025±0.00002 141 1.00065±0.00004 
36 0.0497 280 1.00026±0.00002 147 1.00018±0.00004 
36 0.1050 295 1.00018±0.00002 159 1.00054±0.00004 
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calculations.  The uncertainty in this under-moderated assembly is due primarily to 
uncertainties in the fuel-to-water ratio from the uncertainties in the clad OD and the fuel 
element pitch. 
For the experiments with a pitch of 2.8 cm, the estimated uncertainty is 0.00073±0.00001.  
The accuracy of the uncertainty is again based solely on the Monte Carlo statistics of the 
sensitivity calculations.  For these nearly optimally moderated assemblies, the source of the 
largest uncertainty is from the fissile content of the fuel due to enrichment uncertainties. 
In the analysis of the experiment uncertainties described above, all sources of uncertainty are 
fully considered.  This is appropriate when the results of the experiments are compared to 
unrelated experiments (e.g. critical experiments not done as part of this project).  However, 
when comparisons are made between the experiments described here, that method 
overestimates the actual uncertainties.  Many aspects of the experiments are constant from 
one experiment to another.  For example, the different cores have a given fuel element in the 
same position as described above.  Only the fuel elements that change from core to core need 
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Figure 6-5.  Sources of uncertainty in the experiments when the experiments are 
compared with unrelated critical experiments. 
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be considered in the uncertainty.  When comparing configuration 5 with configuration 2, 
only the uncertainties arising from the fuel elements highlighted in Figure 6-3 need be 
included.  The various uncertainties obtained in this way are shown in Figure 6-6.  The 
aggregate uncertainties are 0.00030±0.00001 for the 2.0 cm pitch experiments and 
0.00040±0.00001 for the 2.8 cm pitch experiments. 
The measured critical array sizes for the ten experiment configurations and the uncertainties 
for both unrelated and correlated experiments are shown in Table 6-4.  The eigenvalues and 
similar uncertainties for integral fuel arrays are shown in Table 6-5. 
6.5. Experiment Biases 
Normally, the models of critical experiments that are used to benchmark codes are simplified 
to decrease the level of effort required to model the experiment.  There are several candidate 
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Figure 6-6.  Sources of uncertainty in the experiments when experiments at a given 
pitch are compared with other experiments in the same set. 
  
41 
 
simplifications to be considered for these experiments.  Each simplification introduces a bias, 
hopefully small, into the model.  The following simplifications were considered: 
1. Elimination of the fuel element springs.  Each fuel element has a corrosion-resistant 
spring at the top of the fuel column. 
2. Replacing the central source fuel element with a driver fuel element.  The neutron source 
that was used to drive the subcritical configurations of the experiment was in a stainless 
steel capsule that was at the midplane of the fuel in the central source rod. 
3. Elimination of the polyethylene-filled projections of the experiment fuel elements. 
Table 6-4.  Measured critical array sizes for the ten critical experiments with 
uncertainty estimates.  The first column of uncertainties is for use when comparing 
these experiments with unrelated experiments.  The second column of uncertainties is 
for use when making comparisons between the experiments reported here. 
Pitch 
(cm) 
Number 
of Expt. 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Measured 
Critical 
Array Size 
(elements) 
Uncertainty for 
Unrelated 
Experiments 
(elements) 
Uncertainty for 
Correlated 
Experiments 
(elements) 
0 - 258.29 2.00 0.45 
36 0 258.09 1.89 0.42 
36 0.0252 270.67 1.96 0.44 
36 0.0497 279.62 2.13 0.48 
2.0 
36 0.1050 294.75 2.01 0.45 
0 - 132.30 0.48 0.26 
36 0 131.97 0.46 0.25 
36 0.0252 140.56 0.50 0.27 
36 0.0497 146.88 0.50 0.27 
2.8 
36 0.1050 158.59 0.55 0.30 
Table 6-5.  Eigenvalues for integral model arrays of the ten critical experiment 
configurations with uncertainty estimates.  The first column of uncertainties is for use 
when comparing these experiments with unrelated experiments.  The second column of 
uncertainties is for use when making comparisons between the experiments reported 
here. 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Number 
of Expt. 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model Size 
(elements) 
Model keff Uncertainty for 
Unrelated 
Experiments 
Uncertainty for 
Correlated 
Experiments 
0 - 258 0.99979 0.00147 0.00033 
36 0 258 0.99993 0.00147 0.00033 
36 0.0252 271 1.00025 0.00147 0.00033 
36 0.0497 280 1.00026 0.00147 0.00033 
2.0 
36 0.1050 295 1.00018 0.00147 0.00033 
0 - 132 0.99954 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0 132 1.00004 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0.0252 141 1.00065 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0.0497 147 1.00018 0.00073 0.00040 
2.8 
36 0.1050 159 1.00054 0.00073 0.00040 
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4. Replacing the control/safety elements with driver fuel elements. 
5. Filling the threaded holes in the ends of the fuel elements with cladding material. 
6. Filling the lateral grooves in the fuel element end plugs with cladding materials. 
The bias introduced by each listed simplification was calculated.  The first two each 
introduced a positive bias while the remainder each introduced a small bias that was 
comparable to the uncertainty in the analysis.   The bias introduced by each of the 
simplifications is shown in Figure 6-7.  The sum of all the biases for the 2.0 cm pitch 
experiments is 0.00026±0.00007.  The sum for the 2.8 cm pitch experiments is 
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0.00087±0.00007.  The eigenvalues including bias for simplified models of the ten critical 
experiments are shown in Table 6-6. 
 
 
Table 6-6.  Eigenvalues including biases for simplified models of integral arrays of the 
ten critical experiment configurations with uncertainty estimates.  The first column of 
uncertainties is for use when comparing these experiments with unrelated experiments.  
The second column of uncertainties is for use when making comparisons between the 
experiments reported here. 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Number 
of Expt. 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model Size 
(elements) 
Model keff Uncertainty for 
Unrelated 
Experiments 
Uncertainty for 
Correlated 
Experiments 
0 - 258 1.00005 0.00147 0.00034 
36 0 258 1.00019 0.00147 0.00034 
36 0.0252 271 1.00051 0.00147 0.00034 
36 0.0497 280 1.00053 0.00147 0.00034 
2.0 
36 0.1050 295 1.00044 0.00147 0.00034 
0 - 132 1.00041 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0 132 1.00092 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0.0252 141 1.00152 0.00073 0.00040 
36 0.0497 147 1.00106 0.00073 0.00040 
2.8 
36 0.1050 159 1.00142 0.00073 0.00040 
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7. Comparison With Analysis 
The scope of the project as proposed included the measurement of the benchmark data but 
did not include the comparison of the measurements with calculations.  However, a 
considerable suite of calculations was done in the safety analysis and uncertainty analysis for 
the experiment.  The following sections that compare the experiment results to the results of 
two analytical methods are included for two reasons: 
1. The comparisons demonstrate the use of the experimental data to test analytical 
methods. 
2. The comparisons, in part, demonstrate the quality of the data taken as part of the 
project. 
In that spirit, the following sections are offered. 
7.1. The Experiments as Criticality Safety Benchmarks 
7.1.1. Comparison With MCNP4C 
The Monte Carlo transport code MCNP4C (LANL 2000), its predecessors and its progeny 
are standard tools used in criticality safety work.  MCNP4C was used extensively to design 
and analyze the critical experiments reported here.  The benchmark configurations reported 
above were analyzed and the calculated eigenvalues (keff) are given in Table 7-1.  The model 
of the critical assembly was sufficiently detailed to warrant comparison with the 
experimental results presented in Table 6-5.  The difference (∆keff) between the calculated 
and measured keff is also shown in the table for each configuration.  The ∆keffs with 
uncertainties are shown graphically in Figure 7-1.  The average ∆keff for the experiments at 
each pitch with the standard deviation is also shown in the table.  
As can be seen in Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1, the ∆keffs for the experiments cluster around 
different average values that depend on the fuel element pitch.  When the uncertainties for 
uncorrelated experiments are included, the results overlap. 
A series of 70 criticality benchmarks from (NEA 2002) using UO2 fuel with enrichment less 
than 5% was analyzed using the same code and cross sections.  Using the terminology of the 
reference, the benchmarks came from experiments LEU-COMP-THERM-001, -002, -008, -
009, -010, -014, -016, -042, and -052.  The average difference between the calculated keff and 
that reported for the 73 configurations was -0.0064 with a standard deviation of 0.0012.  The 
∆keffs for the experiments reported here are consistent with that result when experimental 
uncertainties are considered. 
7.1.2. Comparison with SCALE 4.4a 
The Monte Carlo transport code KENO V.a (ORNL 2000) has been a standard tool used in 
criticality safety work for many years.  KENO V.a was also used to analyze the critical 
experiments reported here.  The benchmark configurations reported above were analyzed and 
the calculated eigenvalues (keff) are given in Table 7-2.  The model of the critical assembly 
was sufficiently detailed to warrant comparison with the experimental results presented in 
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Table 6-5.  The difference (∆keff) between the calculated and measured keff is also shown in 
the table for each configuration.  The ∆keffs with uncertainties are shown graphically in 
Figure 7-2.  The average ∆keff for the experiments at each pitch with the standard deviation is 
also shown in the table.  
As can be seen in Table 7-2 and Figure 7-2, the ∆keffs for the experiments cluster around 
different average values that depend on the fuel element pitch.  In contrast with the MCNP4C 
results, when the uncertainties for uncorrelated experiments are included, the average values 
are significantly different.  As noted above, determination of the cause of the discrepancy is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
A series of 70 criticality benchmarks from (NEA 2002) using UO2 fuel with enrichment less 
than 5% was analyzed using the same code and cross sections.  Using the terminology of the 
reference, the benchmarks came from experiments LEU-COMP-THERM-001, -002, -008, -
009, -010, -014, -016, -042, and -052.  The average difference between the calculated keff and 
Table 7-1.  Results of MCNP4C calculations for the ten critical experiments. 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Experiment
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model 
Elements 
Calculated 
keff  
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
∆keff  
(C-E) 
(note 3) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 4) 
0 - 258 0.99191 0.00007 -0.00786 0.00147 
36 0 258 0.99199 0.00007 -0.00794 0.00147 
36 0.0252 271 0.99218 0.00007 -0.00807 0.00147 
36 0.0497 280 0.99242 0.00007 -0.00784 0.00147 
36 0.1050 295 0.99218 0.00007 -0.00799 0.00147 
Average -0.00794 
2.0 
 
Standard Deviation 0.00009 
(note 5) 
0 - 132 0.99308 0.00007 -0.00645 0.00073 
36 0 132 0.99442 0.00007 -0.00562 0.00073 
36 0.0252 141 0.99458 0.00007 -0.00603 0.00074 
36 0.0497 147 0.99393 0.00007 -0.00625 0.00073 
36 0.1050 159 0.99444 0.00007 -0.00610 0.00074 
Average -0.00609 
2.8 
 
Standard Deviation 0.00031 
(note 5) 
Average -0.00701 
Both 
Standard Deviation 0.00100 
(note 5) 
Note 1: keff is the eigenvalue reported by MCNP4C using cross sections from ENDF/B-VI 
data. 
Note 2: This uncertainty accounts only for the stochastic nature of the calculations. 
Note 3: ∆keff is the difference between the calculated array keff and the experimental array 
keff reported in Table 6-5. 
Note 4: This uncertainty is the sum in quadrature of the statistical uncertainty in the 
calculations and the uncertainty in the measured keff for uncorrelated experiments. 
Note 5: The averages and standard deviations are based solely on the ∆keffs and do not 
account for the experimental uncertainties. 
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that reported for the 73 configurations was -0.0059 with a standard deviation of 0.0030.  The 
∆keffs for the experiments reported here are consistent with that result when experimental 
uncertainties are considered. 
7.2. The Experiments as Tests of Rhodium Cross Sections 
These experiments were designed so that the effect of a specific material could be isolated to 
allow the treatment of that material by an analytical method to be tested.  At each fuel 
element pitch, two experiments were done to 1) provide baseline criticality data to “zero out” 
effects caused by materials other than the test material and 2) provide data on the effect on 
the array of the difference between the driver fuel elements and the experiment fuel elements.  
Experiments were also done with rhodium foils of different thicknesses inserted between the 
fuel pellets in the experiment fuel elements. 
The effect of the rhodium foils on the assembly depended on the thickness of the foils.  For 
each thickness, the “foil worth,” defined as the calculated reactivity change that occurs when 
the experiment foils are voided, was calculated using both MCNP4C and KENO V.a.  The 
MCNP4C ENDF/B-VI
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Figure 7-1.  Bias in the MCNP4C calculations for the ten critical experiments.  The 
data for the experiment with no experiment elements is offset slightly from the axis 
for clarity. 
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foil worth for each configuration is listed in Table 7-3 for both sets of calculations.  The 
MCNP4C results are shown in Figure 7-3 as a function of foil thickness.  Several effects are 
visible in the figure.  First, a given set of foils has a larger reactivity impact on the 2.8 cm 
pitch experiments than on the 2.0 cm pitch experiments.  This is because the experiments at 
2.8 cm pitch have a softer neutron spectrum because they are more optimally moderated and 
the fixed number of experiment rods is a larger fraction of the smaller cores.  Second, the foil 
removal reactivity is sublinear as a function of foil thickness.  This is due to self-shielding in 
the foils.  Third, the reactivity worth of the rhodium foils is relatively large, up to 2.5% at 
2.0 cm pitch and 3.5% at 2.8 cm pitch, giving a large signal relative to the experimental 
uncertainties. 
The ∆keffs given in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 give the overall bias of the analytical methods relative 
to the critical experiments.  The average bias from the tables for MCNP4C is 0.75% and 
0.74% for KENO V.a.  The bias is due to the integration of inaccuracies in the modeling of 
the experiment, inaccuracies of the analytical method, and inaccuracies in the cross section 
Table 7-2.  Results of KENO V.a calculations for the ten critical experiments. 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Experiment
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model 
Elements 
Calculated 
keff 
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
∆keff 
(C-E) 
(note 3) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 4) 
0 - 258 0.99020 0.00004 -0.00957 0.00147 
36 0 258 0.99076 0.00005 -0.00917 0.00147 
36 0.0252 271 0.99081 0.00005 -0.00944 0.00147 
36 0.0497 280 0.99096 0.00004 -0.00930 0.00147 
36 0.1050 295 0.99094 0.00005 -0.00923 0.00147 
Average -0.00934 
2.0 
 
Standard Deviation 0.00016 
(note 5) 
0 - 132 0.99391 0.00006 -0.00563 0.00073 
36 0 132 0.99474 0.00005 -0.00530 0.00073 
36 0.0252 141 0.99535 0.00005 -0.00526 0.00073 
36 0.0497 147 0.99474 0.00005 -0.00544 0.00073 
36 0.1050 159 0.99528 0.00005 -0.00526 0.00073 
Average -0.00538 
2.8 
 
Standard Deviation 0.00016 
(note 5) 
Average -0.00736 
Both 
 
Standard Deviation 0.00210 
(note 5) 
Note 1: keff is the eigenvalue reported by MCNP4C using cross sections from ENDF/B-VI 
data. 
Note 2: This uncertainty accounts only for the stochastic nature of the calculations. 
Note 3: ∆keff is the difference between the calculated array keff and the experimental array 
keff reported in Table 6-5. 
Note 4: This uncertainty is the sum in quadrature of the statistical uncertainty in the 
calculations and the uncertainty in the measured keff for uncorrelated experiments. 
Note 5: The averages and standard deviations are based solely on the ∆keffs and do not 
account for the experimental uncertainties. 
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data.  To test the accuracy of the treatment of one aspect of a calculational scheme, such as 
the accuracy of the treatment of rhodium, the biases from other sources must be removed.  In 
the experiments reported here, that is done by comparing the reactivity difference between 
calculation and experiment for cases that contain the test material with cases that do not.  
Table 7-4 lists this reactivity difference (∆ρ) as calculated by MCNP4C and KENO V.a.  
Because the comparisons are made with experiments in this set, the appropriate experimental 
uncertainties to use are the smaller ones for correlated experiments.  The ratio of the 
uncertainty in ∆ρ to the foil worth is the relative uncertainty in the rhodium reactivity and 
ranges from 1.2 to 3.3 percent.  The relative uncertainties are small enough that the 
experiments can serve as good tests of the analysis of rhodium in the critical experiments. 
The ∆ρs for MCNP4C are shown in Figure 7-4.  The ∆ρs for KENO V.a are shown in Figure 
7-5.  When the overall bias is removed, the ∆ρs for all the experiments are within the 
experimental uncertainty of zero.  There is no discernable trend as a function of foil 
thickness.  Both MCNP4C and KENO V.a reproduce the effect of the rhodium on the 
experiment within the experimental uncertainties. 
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Figure 7-2.  Bias in the KENO V.a calculations for the ten critical experiments.  The 
data for the experiment with no experiment elements is offset slightly from the axis for 
clarity. 
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Table 7-3.  Rhodium foil worth calculated by MCNP4C and KENO V.a for each of the 
critical experiments. 
MCNP4C KENO V.a 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Experiment 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model 
Elements 
Foil 
Worth 
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
Foil 
Worth 
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
0 - 258 0 0 0 0 
36 0 258 0 0 0 0 
36 0.0252 271 0.00969 0.00012 0.00908 0.00008 
36 0.0497 280 0.01554 0.00012 0.01497 0.00008 
2.0 
36 0.1050 295 0.02497 0.00012 0.02378 0.00007 
0 - 132 0 0 0 0 
36 0 132 0 0 0 0 
36 0.0252 141 0.01268 0.00012 0.01210 0.00007 
36 0.0497 147 0.02127 0.00012 0.02070 0.00007 
2.8 
36 0.1050 159 0.03506 0.00012 0.03458 0.00006 
Note 1: This is the calculated reactivity difference between the array with the foils voided 
and the actual array. 
Note 2: This uncertainty is the summed uncertainties in the calculations used to obtain the 
Foil Removal Reactivity. 
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Figure 7-3.  Rhodium foil worth as a function of foil thickness calculated by 
MCNP4C. 
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Table 7-4.  Reactivity difference between calculated and measured results for the ten 
critical experiments. 
MCNP4C KENO V.a 
Pitch 
(mm) 
Experiment 
Elements 
Foil 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Model 
Elements 
∆ρ  
(C-E) 
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
Relative 
Uncer-
tainty 
(%) 
(note 3) 
∆ρ  
(C-E) 
(note 1) 
Uncer-
tainty 
(note 2) 
Relative 
Uncer-
tainty 
(%) 
(note 3) 
0 - 258 0.00004 0.00031 0 -0.00021 0.00030 0 
36 0 258 -0.00004 0.00031 0 0.00021 0.00031 0 
36 0.0252 271 -0.00016 0.00031 3.2 -0.00006 0.00031 3.2 
36 0.0497 280 0.00007 0.00031 2.0 0.00008 0.00030 2.0 
2.0 
36 0.1050 295 -0.00009 0.00031 1.2 0.00014 0.00031 1.2 
0 - 132 -0.00042 0.00041 0 -0.00017 0.00041 0 
36 0 132 0.00042 0.00041 0 0.00017 0.00041 0 
36 0.0252 141 0.00002 0.00041 3.3 0.00022 0.00041 3.3 
36 0.0497 147 -0.00021 0.00041 1.9 0.00003 0.00041 1.9 
2.8 
36 0.1050 159 -0.00005 0.00041 1.2 0.00021 0.00041 1.2 
Note 1: ∆ρ is the reactivity difference between the calculated array keff and the experimental array 
keff with the average reactivity difference for the two arrays with no foils subtracted. 
Note 2: This uncertainty is the sum in quadrature of the statistical uncertainty in the calculated array 
reactivity and the uncertainty in the measured array reactivity for correlated experiments. 
Note 3: The relative uncertainty is the ratio of the uncertainty in ∆ρ and the foil worth from Table 7-
3. 
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Figure 7-4.  Reactivity difference between the MCNP4C calculations and the 
measurements for the ten critical experiments.  The data for the experiment with 
no experiment elements is offset slightly from the axis for clarity. 
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Figure 7-5.  Reactivity difference between the KENO V.a calculations and the 
measurements for the ten critical experiments.  The data for the experiment with 
no experiment elements is offset slightly from the axis for clarity. 
 
  
54 
 
8. Conclusion 
This report has described NERI project 99-0200, Experimental Investigation of Burn-up 
Credit for Safe Transport, Storage, and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel under which the 
Burnup Credit Critical Experiment (BUCCX) was conducted.  The intent of the project was 
to accomplish two goals:  to establish a critical experiment capability at Sandia that can 
address benchmark experiments relevant to the issues of commercial nuclear power and to 
demonstrate that capability by performing measurements with rhodium, an important fission 
product absorber, in the critical experiment.  The project achieved both goals. 
To accommodate the critical experiments, an authorization basis envelope for water-
moderated low-enriched critical experiments was developed at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor 
Facility.  An addendum to the facility safety analysis report was written to address the safety 
issues associated with critical experiments.  Technical Safety Requirements were developed.  
Experiment operating procedures were written.  These documents were subjected to a 
rigorous review process and approved by the appropriate authorities.  The revised 
authorization basis envelope approved as part of the project will benefit future experiments 
of this type. 
A critical assembly that can accommodate the project experiments was developed.  While the 
design concept of the assembly hardware was based on an earlier experiment, much of the 
hardware from the earlier assembly was replaced.  An enabling factor for this project was the 
fact that a large number of fuel elements useful for the experiments had been fabricated as 
part of an earlier project.  The remaining special fuel elements necessary for the critical 
assembly were fabricated as part of the project.  Another enabling factor was the existence of 
an instrumentation and control system used by an earlier critical experiment.  The critical 
experiment hardware is another part of the legacy of the project. 
Ten critical experiments were conducted as part of this project.  Five were performed with a 
fuel to water ratio that was significantly undermoderated and comparable to that of 
commercial reactor fuel assemblies.  Another five were performed with a fuel to water ratio 
that produced nearly optimal moderation.  Each of the experiments can stand alone as a 
criticality benchmark.  As such, the experimental uncertainties in the keff of the benchmark 
configurations were 0.0015 for the undermoderated experiments and 0.0009 for the optimally 
moderated experiments.  These uncertainties compare very well with the uncertainties for 
other critical experiments in the literature. 
With appropriate treatment, the effect of the rhodium on the critical experiments can be 
isolated as a function of the quantity of rhodium present for each set of five experiments.  
When the experiments are used this way, the experimental uncertainties decrease to 0.0003 
for the undermoderated experiments and 0.0004 for the optimally moderated experiments.  
These uncertainties, combined with the calculated rhodium worth in the experiments give 
relative uncertainties in the rhodium worth of 1 to 3%. 
The function of criticality safety benchmarks is to serve as tests of the analytical methods 
used in criticality safety calculations.  The results of the critical experiments were compared 
to the results of two transport codes.  The bias in the calculations when these experiments 
were modeled was similar to the bias in the codes when other critical experiments are 
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considered.  Both codes predicted the rhodium behavior within the experimental 
uncertainties. 
In addition to producing benchmark critical measurements and data on rhodium in critical 
systems, this project leaves intact a capability to perform low-enriched critical experiments at 
Sandia.  A large fraction of the project resources was expended establishing this capability.  
Subsequent critical experiments can use the capability with a much-reduced up-front cost.    
There are a number of ways that this capability can be exploited.  In fact, another NERI 
project using this capability, Reactor Physics and Criticality Benchmark Evaluations for 
Advanced Nuclear Fuel (01-124) was in progress when this report was written.  Other 
possible uses of the critical experiment capability could be: 
1. Measure the behavior of other fission products on a critical system.  Such follow-on 
experiments could be used to provide the justification for the inclusion of fission product 
in the criticality analysis of spent fuel shipping, storage, and disposal configurations. 
2. Measure static reactor physics parameters of critical systems with higher (e.g. >5%) 
enrichment such as are being done in NERI project 01-124.  Such experiments could 
include measurements of fission density profiles, soluble poison reactivity worths, 
burnable poison rod reactivity worth, and others. 
3. Examine the static reactivity behavior of new burnable poison types or configurations. 
4. Perform critical experiments with variable enrichments to simulate the graded 
enrichments in BWR cores. 
5. Examine cores with axially graded enrichment and possibly graded fission product 
content to simulate the end effects in spent nuclear fuel. 
6. Perform critical experiments with Generation IV fuels and with transmutation fuels. 
7. Examine the reactor physics behavior of transmutation targets. 
These are examples of experiments that could be performed with the critical experiment 
capability established as part of this project.  Many other studies are possible. 
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